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Understanding the review you are now reading engages
knowledge of three kinds: you have knowledge of the
physical world (perception of the visual patterns that
constitute the text of the review), knowledge of another
person’s mind (that aspect of the author’s mind communi-
cated here through written language), and knowledge of
your own mind (you have your beliefs and opinions about
the piece). Cognitive neuroscience underwrites the con-
viction that it is your brain that is mediating all three
aspects of knowing about the world; the challenge is to
explain how the brain does it. We know that our beliefs
about the world are often mistaken and that even our
beliefs about ourselves are subject to revision. So how is
it that we seem to mostly get it right?
In his new book entitled Making Up the Mind, Chris Frith
provides a highly accessible and easy to read overview of
the way in which the brain mediates knowledge about the
physical and social world. His basic answer to the question
of how the brain does it is familiar (brains construct models
of the world), but his perspective distinguishes this book
from many other popular books that describe the relation
between mind and brain. Frith is careful to note that he is
not out to explain conscious experience or to solve the
mind-body problem. He emphasizes that brains are funda-
mentally adapted not merely to construct models based
on sensory information, but to act on the world and to pre-
dict the consequences of those actions. This emphasis
might be expected for those familiar with Frith’s own
work, which has been at the forefront of neuroscience
studies in agency and social interaction.
Frith is Professor of Neuropsychology at the Wellcome
Trust Center for Neuroimaging at University College
London, one of the foremost neuroimaging centers in the
world. Together with his wife Uta and many distinguished
students, he has conducted seminal studies of how our
sense of will and agency depend on particular brain struc-
tures; more recently these studies have been extended
into studies of imitation, empathy, and social cooperativity.
If you ask him, he may confide to you that he intends to
‘‘retire’’ very soon, which for him means shifting energy
from experiments to writing books. The present one can
thus be seen as the first installment in a series of volumes
we might expect, and it provides glimpses of directions to
be taken in his future writings.
One attitude toward our leading question, how the
brain manages to generate mostly true beliefs aboutthe world, is to doubt that it does so. Philosophers
have long debated the faith we can put in our apparent
knowledge of the world, but many of them have mean-
while joined laypeople in taking our patent adaptive be-
havior as evidence that, in fact, we do mostly get things
right. Frith’s book follows a similar course from initial
doubt about our experience of the world to a very lucid
introduction to the mechanisms that assure that our
mind’s model of the world coincides with reality in
some sense.
The book is structured in three parts, each containing
chapters that have brief summaries at the end. The first
part describes how the brain creates our perception of
the physical world, and how this can break down follow-
ing neurological or psychiatric disease. There will be little
new here for cognitive neuroscientists, but it is entertain-
ing to read and an excellent introduction for the general
reader. The entire first three chapters of the book are
concerned with pointing out our indirect and often erro-
neous knowledge of the world. There are numerous ex-
amples from patients with specific neurological injuries
that show there can be evidence for knowledge about
the world from a person’s actions even when they are
unaware of that knowledge. There are more pathological
cases yet, of course, where there is not just a lack of
conscious access, but a person’s beliefs are in fact de-
luded—hallucinations of various kinds fall into this cate-
gory. There are also examples from normal perception,
such as change blindness, a phenomenon where we
fail to notice an often large change in a visual scene be-
cause we fail to pay attention to it; in a sense, we see the
change, but we cannot report it because it is notNeuron 56, November 21, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 593
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part of the book concludes by showing us that even
knowledge of our own bodies can be mistaken: we sim-
ply do not have incorrigible or indubitable access to any
aspect of the world.
Part two is perhaps the most developed part of the
book, and probably the one most interesting to neurosci-
entists. It describes how brains predict events in the
world, including their own actions and the outcomes of
those. This part puts mind and world back together again
by explaining how brains can build models of the world
that are based on learning and on making errors in such
a way that they will generally improve our future expecta-
tions of the way the world is. Temporal difference learning
and Bayesian updating are explained in a very clear and
introductory way. As Frith points out, it is critical that we
have expectations, even when they are wrong, because
these are the priors on which Bayesian models are based,
and the prerequisite for learning from experience. The
section concludes with a chapter on how we model the
goals and intentions of other people, and throughout there
are illustrative examples from research studies, including
the author’s own.
The third and last section of the book is the shortest and
asks how shared experience of the world, and communi-
cation about it, can generate social learning and culture.
The book concludes with an interesting epilogue in which
Frith speculates that aspects of social behavior that may
be unique to humans, such as nonreciprocal altruism
and altruistic punishment, depend on our sense of agency
and on our beliefs that other people are free agents as
well.
The three parts of the book, and the short summaries
sprinkled at various places throughout them, follow a log-
ical plan. The first few chapters describe how much cog-
nitive processing goes on below the level of conscious
awareness and how indirect is the link between the con-
tents of our minds and the world they purport to repre-
sent. Part two of the book does most of the work in ex-
plaining how we improve our models and how they lead
to adaptive behavior with experience and learning. There
are numerous descriptions of fascinating neuropsycho-
logical cases given throughout, as there are personal
and historical vignettes, and Frith’s enthusiasm for doing
science is apparent on every page. The book is not only
easy to read prose in general, but often amusing and en-
tertaining. One device Frith deploys is an imaginary part-
ner in conversation, a professor of English, with whom
he argues to set up the questions more clearly. This
may strike some readers (and has struck some re-
viewers) as a bit annoying; but the English professor
makes spare appearances, and I found the idea mildly
entertaining.
The book is best suited for a general readership inter-
ested in cognitive neuroscience, and also for beginning
students in the field. One particular strength is its convey-
ance of the author’s passion for doing science and the
excitement of the questions. For cognitive neuroscientists594 Neuron 56, November 21, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.and philosophers of mind, the book serves more as a tem-
plate and advertisement for in-depth treatments that, one
hopes, will appear from Frith’s pen in the near future. The
second section of the book could easily be expanded
into a solid cognitive neuroscience volume, much of it
describing the author’s own work. The third section of
the book would make for an exciting more philosophical
book on the role of social communication and culture in
generating models and knowledge of the world. The au-
thor is in a unique position to make a major contribution
here, and it is a very timely topic.
There are some perspectives in the book that could also
form a basis for fruitful disagreements and debate. There
is an emphasis on learning, somewhat marginalizing
innate aspects of knowledge. There is also an emphasis
on viewing the brain’s model of the world as mediating
all our knowledge of the world, neglecting the possibility
that considerable knowledge may be distributed in a con-
sensual social model (part three of the book hints at this)
and that many aspects of knowledge may not be modeled
at all, but simply there in the world. Frith acknowledges
that our models do not contain all that we can know, as
in the phenomenon of change-blindness mentioned
earlier, but it is clear that he would not subscribe to any
kind of Gibsonian ‘‘direct’’ perception and still sees the
contents of our experience of the world as that of the
brain’s models, rather than as of the world itself. None
of these issues are ones on which Frith’s views are
contentious—indeed, his treatment is very balanced, but
it does leave room for further discussion and debate about
emphasis.
There is a final issue that Frith’s book does omit:
knowledge of our own minds. The book discusses
knowledge of the external world, of other minds, and
of our own bodies. But it leaves out a discussion of
how we know what goes on in our own minds—how
do we know what we think and believe? There are puz-
zles about this aspect of knowledge, since first-person
knowledge patently has a more authoritative status
than third-person knowledge. We can agree with Frith
that, like for knowledge about the world and other
minds, we can be mistaken about knowledge of our
own minds; nonetheless, both the way in which we
know about the contents of our own minds and the force
of what we say about that are unique in many respects.
Many other animals know about their physical environ-
ment through building models, and in most of them at
least some of this knowledge is accompanied by con-
scious experience of the world. But it seems doubtful
that any animal other than Homo sapiens can think
about the content of its own mind and has concepts
that distinguish objective and subjective. It also remains
obscure on the basis of what kind of information or
evidence we can construct a model of our own mind,
since we typically (unlike our models of other minds)
do not base it on behavioral observation. Frith’s last
chapter motivates some initial ideas for how this might
nonetheless be based, at least in part, on behavioral
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Book Reviewevidence: we use other people as a mirror for ourselves.
By finding out what others think and say about us, we
might update our model of what we believe and what
kind of person we think we are. In this way, the intersub-jective nature of social groups and culture may provide
us with an objective source of knowledge to update
a model of ourselves. To find out how this works in de-
tail, look for a book by Chris Frith in the near future.
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